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NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 
V. ROWE: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF MAINE'S 
ATTEMPT TO REGULATE INTERNET SALES OF 
TOBACCO TO MINORS 
Nathaniel Bryans· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass 'n v. Rowe, 1 trade associations sought a 
declaratory judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 
1994 (F AAAA) 2 preempts a Maine law enacted to facilitate collection of state taxes 
and restrict the delivery of tobacco products to minors (the Tobacco Delivery Law). 3 
The district court granted the plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment in part, 
finding that a single provision oflittle independent consequence escaped preemption, 
and enjoined enforcement of the preempted provisions. 4 The state appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that most of Maine's 
Tobacco Delivery Law is preempted. 
Part II of this Note will outline the contours off AAAA preemption jurisprudence 
from which the NH Motor Transport IV court was purportedly confined to draw in 
reaching its conclusion. It will briefly address the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
(ADA) 5-the predecessor to the FAAAA-and the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of its preemptive provision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 6 It 
will then analyze select progeny of Morales decided following the enactment of the 
F AAAA: American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens7 and United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Flores-
Galarza. 8 
Part III will examine the purposes and mechanics of Maine's Tobacco Delivery 
Law and Maine's arguments against FAAAA preemption. To some degree, these 
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006),petitionfor cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2006) (No. 
06-457). 
2. Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ofl 994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, I 08 Stat. I 569 
(express preemption provisions codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1450J(c)(l) & 41713(b)(4)(A) 
(2000)). 
3. An Act to Regulate the Sale of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Cigarettes to Minors, 
codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1551, 1555-C &-D (West 2004). 
4. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport Ill), 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200-01 (D. 
Me. 2005), a.ff din part and rev 'din part, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court issued three 
separate summary judgment opinions in the underlying litigation. For the sake of convenience, the opinions 
of the district court will be referred to as N.H. Motor Transport I, II & III; the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit will be referred to as N.H. Motor Transport IV. 
5. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000)). 
6. 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
7. 513 U.S. 219 (1995). 
8. 318 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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arguments are based on the legislative history of the F AAAA, which provides in 
relevant part: 
State economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes significant 
inefficiencies, increased costs, reduction of competition, inhibition of innovation and 
technology and curtails the expansion of markets .... In the small package express 
business, companies frequently ship goods across state lines and back into the state 
of origin to avoid the higher rates for purely intrastate shipments. Lifting of these 
antiquated controls will permit our transportation companies to freely compete more 
efficiently and provide quality service to their customers. Service options will be 
dictated by the marketplace; and not by an artificial regulatory structure. 9 
Maine argued that its efforts to protect the health and welfare of its minor citizens and 
collect unpaid tobacco taxes cannot be characterized as components of an artificial 
regulatory structure. To the contrary, the state maintained that its law (I) is foremost 
a legitimate exercise of Maine's police power that advances a vested interest of the 
state as a consumer of federal grants and a provider of health-related anti-smoking 
services for minors, and (2) was duly enacted pursuant to its concurrent jurisdiction-
as provided by federal law-to enforce proscriptions on trafficking in contraband 
cigarettes. 10 
Part IV will analyze the N.H. Motor Transport litigation. Before focusing on the 
First Circuit's decision, it will address the district court's three summary judgment 
decisions, as they are necessary to understand the two equally important threshold 
issues regarding association standing and mootness that the First Circuit was required 
to decide before reaching the merits of F AAAA preemption. 11 Once these predicate 
jurisdictional issues were settled in appellees' favor, the N.H. Motor Transport IV 
court issued a decision on the merits that represents a compromise of doubtful 
9. H.R. REP. No. 103-677, at 87-88 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in I 994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 
1774-75. 
10. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport IV), 448 F.3d 66, 78 n. 12 (1st Cir. 
2006) (discussing the Synar Amendment); N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197,203 (D. Me. 
2005) (discussing the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act). At least with respect to the first two of the 
following three federal laws-the Contraband Cigarette Act, the Synar Amendment, and the Jenkins 
Act-the Attorney General advocated that although the Tobacco Delivery Law may be "regulatory," it is 
hardly "artificial." The Synar Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26, provides that a state may qualify to 
receive certain federal grants for the purpose of planning, carrying out, and evaluating activities to prevent 
and treat substance abuse only if the state "has in effect a law providing that it is unlawful for any 
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco products to sell or distribute any such product to any 
individual under the age ofl 8." 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26(a)(I) (2000). In addition, the Contraband Cigarette 
Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-46, explicitly provides that federal cigarette trafficking laws do not 
disturb "the concurrent jurisdiction of a State to enact and enforce cigarette tax Jaws, to provide for the 
confiscation of cigarettes and other property seized for violation of such laws, and to provide for penalties 
for the violation of such laws." 18 U.S.C. § 2345(a) (2000). Moreover, Jax federal enforcement of the 
Jenkins Act reporting requirements, 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-377, which require that interstate cigarette retailers 
report all untaxed sales to state taxing authorities, has created something of a regulatory vacuum in which 
states cannot reasonably be expected to languish in perpetuity. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: INTERNET CIGARETTE SALES-GIVING ATF 
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING AND ENFORCEMENT, GAO 02-743 (Aug. 2002) 
(detailing the Jack of federal enforcement of the Jenkins Act reporting requirements), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02743.pdf. 
11. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 71-74 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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prospective utility between Congress's commerce power on the one hand and the 
police power of the state on the other. 12 The analysis will show that although the 
appeal provided the court an opportunity to demarcate clearly the limits of the express 
preemption provisions of the F AAAA 13 in a manner consistent with other jurisdictions, 
the First Circuit's approach to F AAAA preemption represents a significant departure 
from other courts' interpretations of closely-related issues. This Note suggests that the 
uncertain-and arguably wrongly decided-precedent by which the court was 
ostensibly bound ultimately rendered the court's efforts unsatisfactory. 14 
Part V will consider whether an alternatively drafted law that strengthens Maine's 
regulatory hand would survive F AAAA challenge in the First Circuit. Part V will 
address the following questions: Is it possible that Maine over-reached by combining 
in a single enactment a revenue collection provision and a citizen health provision? 
Should simpler mechanisms be employed to forestall a future adverse preemption 
ruling based on a finding of "forbidden significant effect" of state law on interstate 
carriers? Does New York's law-which proscribes all delivery of cigarettes to 
consumers 15-represent a viable model? 
This Note will conclude by suggesting that, notwithstanding whatever course the 
United States Supreme Court may chart in this or a related case, 16 Congress should 
clarify the inherent authority of the states to control the importation of harmful tobacco 
products across their borders. Only by affirming the jurisdiction of states in the quasi-
regulation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce-when those instrumentalities 
choose to deal in notoriously harmful consumer goods--can the seemingly intractable 
issues raised by the NH. Motor Transport litigation be put to rest. 
II. F AAAA PREEMPTION 
As the district court explained in NH. Motor Transport III, "[ t]ederal regulation 
of the transportation industry dates back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 
which created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate interstate 
railroad carriers." 17 Congress brought interstate motor carriers under ICC control by 
enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,18 and likewise extended ICC control to air 
transportation by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 19 The duly-created Civil 
12. See id. at 82. 
13. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
14. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 82 (holding (I) a provision requiring tobacco retailers 
to utilize carriers that provide purchaser age verification services on delivery to be preempted, and (2) a 
provision charging a carrier with knowledge, under certain circumstances, that a package it transports 
contains contraband tobacco products likewise to be preempted, but that (3) "to the extent that the Tobacco 
Delivery Law merely bars all persons (including carriers) from knowingly transporting contraband tobacco 
into Maine, the F AAAA is not implicated"). 
15. See infra note 132. 
16. On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Docket in Rowe v. N.H. Motor 
Transp. Ass'n, No. 06-457 (1st Cir. Filed Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
docket/06-457 .htm. 
17. N.H. Motor Transport lll, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197,201 (D. Me. 2005). 
18. Id.; see also Motor Carrier Act, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
19. N.H. Motor Transport III, 377 F. Supp. 2d at201; see also Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 
973 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State 
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Aeronautics Authority, reorganized as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, was charged with "govem[ing the] entry, routes, rates, 
business practices and safety of the airline industry."20 
A. The Deregulatory Background 
CAB 's jurisdiction of aviation was not exclusive of state jurisdiction, however, 
until Congress enacted the ADA in 1978 in an effort to deregulate air transportation. 21 
By virtue of pre-1978 concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over air travel, there 
existed an awkward possibility that airline passengers traveling between two cities 
within the same state would be charged different fares. 22 Even though these passengers 
were purchasing identical services, the fares they could expect to pay would depend 
on "whether [they] were interstate passengers whose fares [were] regulated by the 
CAB, or intrastate passengers, whose fare[s] [were] regulated by a State." 23 In order 
to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations," 24 the ADA included an express 
preemption provision: 
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political 
agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, 
standard, or other provision having the force and effect oflaw relating to rates, routes, 
or services of any air carrier having authority ... to provide interstate air transporta-
tion. 25 
Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1954) (recognizing Air Commerce Act of 1926 
and Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 are bottomed on Congress's commerce power). 
20. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 201-02. 
21. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 105(a)(l), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (current version at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 4 l 713(b )( 4)(A)(2000)). Federal deregulation of the air transportation industry and judicial interpretation 
thereof has generated exte;sive scholarly comment. See Matthew Azoulay, Note, American Airlines, Inc. 
v. Wolens: The Supreme Court's Reregulation of the Airline Industry, 5 WIDENER]. PUB. L. 405 (1996); 
John W. Freeman, State Regulation of Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 747 (1979); Joshua Iacuone, Note, Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, lnc.-Defining "Service" Under 
the Airline Deregulation Act: Why the Majority a/Circuits Are Wrong, 66 J. AIRL. & COM. 861 (2001); 
Matthew J. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State 
Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873 (2000); Eric W. Maclure, Note, Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption Provision Clips States' Wings on Regulation of Air Fare Advertising, 
71 N.C. L. REV. 905 (I 993); Eric E. Murphy, Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an 
Air Carrier's Services, 71 U. CHI. L.REv. 1197 (2004); Daniel H. Rosenthal, Note,Legal Turbulence: The 
Court's Misconstrual of the Airline Deregulation Act's Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers' 
Rights, 51 DUKE L.J. 1857 (2002); Kyle Volluz, Comment, The Aftermath of Morales and Wolens: A 
Review of the Current State of Federal Preemption of State Law Claims Under the Airline Deregulation 
Acto/1978, 62 J.AIRL.&COM. 1195 (1997). 
22. H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 15-16 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3751-52. 
23. Id. at 3 773 n. l ("An interstate carrier may carry two types of passengers between two cities in a 
single State: intrastate passengers whose entire journey is between those two cities, and interstate passengers 
who are traveling between the two cities on one airline and then connecting to another airline to complete 
an out-of-State journey."). 
24. Id. 
25. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § I 05(a)( I), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (current version at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000)). 
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As the First Circuit recognized in N.H Motor Transport IV, the Supreme Court 
decision of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 26 is the "seminal case" interpreting 
the explicit preemption provision of the ADA, and, by extension, the similarly worded 
provision in the FAAAA. 27 In Morales, the Texas Attorney General sought review of 
a lower court's order 8 enjoining the state's enforcement of "standards governing the 
content and format of airline advertising" that had been adopted by the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). 29 Plaintiffs Trans World Airlines, 
Continental Airlines, and British Airways argued that the states were preempted by the 
ADA from enforcing these advertising guidelines because they related to the carriers' 
rates. 
The Morales Court 30 began its preemption analysis with the proposition that any 
question regarding federal preemption, whether express or implied, is "at bottom ... 
one of statutory intent," and all answers "'begin with the language employed by 
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose. "' 31 Accordingly, focusing its interpretive energies 
on the AD A's "relating to" language, the Court consulted not only a common reference 
work32 but also its own precedent 33 in the semantically analogous area of Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preemption. 34 
Petitioner advanced five arguments in an attempt to dissuade the Court from 
adopting an overly broad interpretation of ADA preemption to which the NAAG 
guidelines would most certainly fall prey. 35 Although the Court duly noted each, all 
26. 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
27. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2006). 
28. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Tex. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part sub nom. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
29. Morales, 504 U.S. at 3 79 ("[The Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines] contain[ ed] detailed 
standards governing the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding of premiums to regular 
customers ... and the payment of compensation to passengers who voluntarily yield their seats on 
overbooked flights."). 
30. Justice Scalia wrote for a 5-3 majority; Justice Souter took no part in the decision. Id. at 378, 391. 
31. Id. at 383 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. DollarPark&Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)(applying 
textual rule of statutory construction under the Lanham Act)}. 
32. Id. (quoting the then-current edition ofBlack's Law Dictionary, the majority reported that "relating 
to" meant "to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association 
with or connection with"). 
33. Id. at 383-84 (citing prior characterizations ofERISA preemption provision: Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) ("[The] breadth of[ERISA's] pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its] 
language."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (ERISA preemption 
has a "broad scope."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1987) ("[D]eliberately 
expansive" ERISA preemption has "expansive sweep."); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McC!endon, 498 U.S. 133, 
137 (1990) (ERISA preemption provision is "broadly worded."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 
(1990) (ERISA preemption clause is "conspicuous for its breadth.")). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § I !44(a) (2000) ("[T]he provisions of this title and subchapter ill of this chapter shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan 
.... ") (emphasis added). 
35. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384-87. The state argued that the following considerations counseled against 
borrowing from ERIS A jurisprudence: First, the extraordinary reach ofERISA preemption is a function not 
of the statutory language, but ofERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme, a defining characteristic that 
the ADA lacked. Second, the ADA clause that saved from preemption then-existing common law and 
statutory remedies is broader than the ERISA saving clause. Third, the ADA only prevents states from 
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were summarily rejected. 36 Blinded by the identical statutory language of the ADA and 
ERISA, the Morales Court evidently understood petitioner's arguments to amount to 
an invitation to overrule ERISA precedent. At the very least, the Court may have 
decided that any agreement with petitioner would have resulted in grave confusion in 
the area ofERISA preemption. Perhaps motivated by these concerns, the majority's 
disposition seems to suggest that given its chosen method of statutory construction-
intent divined from a plain reading of the language-two identically phrased explicit 
preemption provisions cannot be interpreted differently. The conclusion that the 
ERISA standard should define the contours of ADA preemption was thus 
inescapable. 37 
Once the Morales Court satisfied itself that the ERISA standard was applicable 
to the challenged NAAG guidelines, it had little trouble finding the guidelines 
preempted. 38 The Court took two approaches to this analysis, reaching the same result 
under each: First, the Court determined the guidelines contained damning '"reference 
to' airfares." 39 Second, the Court found as an economic matter that the guidelines had 
a "forbidden significant effect upon fares. "40 Because the majority's economic analysis 
was unsupported by any actual economic data, the advertising guidelines' "significant 
effect" on the airlines' rates was proven on purely theoretical grounds, which the 
dissent found unsatisfactory. 41 Restrictions on price advertising in the singularly 
actually prescribing rates, routes, and services. Fourth, only state law directly addressed to the airline 
industry is preempted, saving the challenged guidelines to the extent they are state laws of general 
applicability. Finally, preemption is inappropriate where state and federal law are not in conflict. Id. 
36. Id. (noting that first, breadth of ERISA preemption was based on meaning of"relates to"; second, 
general remedies saving clause cannot be read to trump specific preemptive language; third, "relates to" 
obviously cannot be restrictively read to mean "regulates"; fourth, a generally applicable state regulation 
may yet "relate to" a subject Congress has carved out for itself; and fifth, consistency with federal law is 
immaterial under an express preemption provision). 
3 7. Id. at 383-84 ("State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline 'rates, 
routes, or services' are pre-empted under [the ADA]."). 
38. Id. at 391. 
39. Id. at 388 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (quoting definition of 
"relate" provided by same edition of Black's Law Dictionary consulted by the Morales Court)). The 
Morales Court stated that violations of the NAAG guidelines pertaining to advertised airfares ''would give 
consumers a cause of action ... for an airline's failure to provide a particular advertised fare----effectively 
creating an enforceable right to that fare when the advertisement fails to include the mandated explanations 
and disclaimers." Id. 
40. Id. Following the Morales analysis, the courts of appeals have been attempting to discern 
"significant forbidden effects" in subsequent cases, with varying success. See, e.g., N.H. Motor Transport 
IV, 448 F.3d 66, 71-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Garyv. Air Group, Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding 
airline employee's state law whistleblower claim not preempted by ADA); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
366 F.3d 380,386 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding airline passenger's state law tort claim preempted by the ADA); 
United Parcel Serv. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323 (I st Cir. 2003); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 
F.3d 1248, 1264 (I Ith Cir. 2003), cert. denied, AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Branche, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004) 
(holding airline employee's retaliatory discharge claim under state law not preempted by the ADA); Charas 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)(holding ADA does not preempt airline 
passengers' state law tort claims arising from provision ofin-flight services by airline employees); Wagman 
v. Federal Express Corp., 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995) (Table) (holding state law consumer fraud claims 
based on misleading advertising preempted by the ADA). 
41. Morales, 504 U.S. at 427 & n.7 (internal quotation omitted) ("[T]he airlines have not sustained 
their burden of proving that compliance with the NAAG guidelines would have a 'significant' effect on 
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complex airline industry, the majority reasoned, would result in less information 
broadcast to consumers. To the extent the NAAG guidelines required additional 
disclosures, and sometimes different notices in different states based on local taxes and 
surcharges, "the obligations imposed by the guidelines would have a significant impact 
upon the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a significant impact upon 
the fares they charge." 42 
By way of conclusion, the majority pondered a hypothetical state restriction on 
non-price advertising where "the connection [between the restriction and carrier rates] 
would be far more tenuous. "43 While reminding its audience that the NAAG guidelines 
did not present a borderline question, the Court suggested such a borderline case might 
exist, and certain state regulations "'may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, 
or peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect." 44 Absent a requirement that 
degrees of effect-whether substantial or tenuous-be proven in subsequent cases on 
a quantifiable basis, however, the Court's rule merely invites future litigants to argue 
theoretical relatedness and theoretically significant effects. Moreover, the Court's 
passing reference to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) authority to regulate 
airline advertising in the state attorneys' general stead does little to clarify what role 
such federal authority, as a backstop for suspended police powers of the states, should 
play in F AAAA preemption analysis. It is reasonably clear that had Congress not 
conferred on the DOT "power to prohibit advertisements which in its opinion do not 
further competitive pricing," 45 the majority's conclusion would have remained the 
same. 
The dissent, on the other hand, was convinced not only that adoption of the ERISA 
standard was incorrect, but also that the airlines' failure to adduce data in support of 
their arguments required reversal, even under the majority's generous standard. 46 The 
crux of the dissent's disagreement with the majority was the extent to which Congress 
intended to preempt state laws that "related," first and foremost, to the advertising of 
a product-in this case airline services-rather than to the services themselves. 47 
Proceeding under the presumption against preemption, 48 the dissent investigated the 
their ability to market their product and, therefore, on their rates.") (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 390. 
43. Id. (noting, for example, that the decision does not "lead[] to pre-emption of state laws against 
gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines"). 
44. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)). 
45. Id. at 390-91. 
46. Id. at 419 ("[In adopting the ERISA standard], the Court disregards established canons of statutory 
construction, and gives the ADA pre-emption provision a construction that is neither compelled by its text 
nor supported by its legislative history.") (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4 7. Id. at 419-20 ("In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain 
Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue." ( quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985))). See also Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 740 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("[The] presumption that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state 
regulation" underscores preemption analysis.); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 
( I 98 I) ("[Preemption analysis] must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental 
authority preserved in our federalist system."). 
48. As the First Circuit noted in N.H. Motor Transport IV, the presumption against federal preemption 
was articulated by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
Although it may be fairly well understood how the presumption is to be rebutted in any given case, the 
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history, purpose, and structure of the ADA and concluded "there [is no] indication that 
the House and conferees thought that the pre-emption of state laws 'relating to rates, 
routes, or services' pre-empted substantially more than state laws 'regulating rates, 
routes, or services. "' 49 
B. TheFAAAA 
It was against this backdrop that Congress amended the ADA and enacted the 
F AAAA in 1994. In doing so, Congress extended the preemption provision of the 
ADA to independent motor carriers ofproperty5° and certain other property carriers. 51 
This extension was in response to certain judicial interpretations of the ADA that had 
resulted in "inequities" between independent motor carriers on the one hand and motor 
carriers affiliated with air carriers on the other. 52 Additionally, congressional findings 
indicated that "[s]tate economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes 
significant inefficiencies" in the marketplace, and that preemption of these regulations 
is "necessary to facilitate interstate commerce." 53 For the most part, however, 
Congress was satisfied with the judiciary's treatment of the ADA, and took steps to 
assure that the "prior judicial case law interpreting" the ADA would be unimpaired by 
minor linguistic adjustments in the FAAAA.54 In particular, the House Report 
explicitly approved of the Morales Court's interpretation of the ADA preemption 
provision, and explained the conferees' intention not to "alter the broad preemption 
interpretation" articulated in Morales. 55 
Foil owing the F AAAA' s enactment, the Supreme Court was again called upon to 
analyze the preemption provision in American Airlines v. Wolens.56 Consumers 
participating in American's frequent flyer program sought monetary damages for the 
requisite conditions for its proper application in the first instance are not altogether clear. N.H. Motor 
Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74-75 n. l 0 (I st Cir. 2006). See infra note 108. 
49. Morales, 504 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50. 49 U.S.C. § 1450l(c)(l) (2000) ("[A] State ... maynotenactorenforce a law, regulation, or other 
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with 
respect to the transportation of property."). 
51. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A)(2000) ("[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or 
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier or 
carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling ownership when such carrier is 
transporting property by aircraft or by motor vehicle .... "). 
52. H.R. REP. No. 103-677, at 87 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759 
(noting the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Federal Express Corp. v. California 
Public Utilities Commission, 936 F.2d I 075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992), where state 
regulations were held to apply to UPS because of its status as a motor carrier, whereas the same regulations 
were preempted by the ADA as to Federal Express because it was an air carrier). Accordingly, the 
legislative history of the F AAAA indicates that the two preemption provisions are "intended to function in 
the exact same manner ... to create a completely level playing field between air carriers and carriers 
affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling ownership on the one hand and motor carriers 
on the other." Id. at 85. 
53. Id. at 87. 
54. Id. at 83 ("In substituting the word 'related' for the prior word 'relating' and the word 'price' for 
the [prior] word 'rates' we are intending no substantive change to the [ADA] preemption provision .... "). 
55. Id. 
56. 513U.S.219(1995). 
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airline's alleged devaluation of their accumulated credits caused by retroactive 
modifications to the program. 57 The plaintiffs argued that American's modifications 
constituted breach of contract and violated state consumer protection laws.58 The 
Illinois Supreme Court refused to find the contract and state law claims preempted by 
the ADA, deciding instead that both categories of claims fit the "too tenuous, remote, 
or peripheral" exception referenced in the Morales Court's conclusion. 59 
On appeal, the Wolens Court determined that although the claims based on 
violations of enacted state law were preempted, the private contract claims could 
proceed. 60 The Court reasoned that to the extent the relevant provisions of the state 
consumer protection laws were legislative attempts to impose on airlines a standardized 
marketing regime, and because plaintiffs' claims were predicated on deviation from 
this regime, they were preempted by the F AAAA. 61 Conversely, because enforcement 
of American's contractual bargain with consumers would merely "afford[] relief to a 
party who claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself 
stipulated, "62 those contract claims were not preempted by the F AAAA. 63 Because the 
majority noted substantial, qualitative similarities between the NAAG guidelines struck 
down in Morales and the state law cause of action under which plaintiffs were claiming 
damages in Wolens, the decisions provide points ofreference for each of the F AAAA's 
proscriptions on state action: A state shall neither enact (Morales) nor enforce 
(Wolens) a law related to a carrier's price, route, or service. 
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Flores-Galarza,64 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit was asked to decide whether the F AAAA preempted a 
statutory scheme enacted and enforced by Puerto Rico to effect collection of certain 
excise taxes.65 Although much of the court's unanimous opinion is devoted to 
predicate jurisdictional issues, it is significant for present purposes in two respects. 
First, the court provided a definition of United Parcel Service (UPS) "services" as a 
carrier under the F AAAA, a definition employed in the N.H. Motor Transport IV 
57. Id. at 222. 
58. Id. at 225 (citing Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. § 505 (1992)). 
59. Wolens v. American Airlines, 157 Ill. 2d 466, 473 (l 993)("1n view ofour finding that frequent 
flyer programs are peripheral to the operation of an airline, it follows that plaintiff's State law claims for 
money damages bear only a tangential, or tenuous, relation to American's rates, routes, and services."). 
60. American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,228 (1995). 
61. Id. (noting the F AAAA's purpose to leave exclusively to the airlines ''the selection and design of 
marketing mechanisms" in furtherance of their commercial enterprise). 
62. Id. at 232-33. 
63. Id. at 233 ("This distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes 
confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement 
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement."). 
64. 318 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 2003). 
65. Id. at 326 (''No interstate carrier transporting a package subject to an excise levied by the 
Commonwealth may deliver the package to its intended recipient unless the recipient (the 'consignee') 
presents a certificate from the Department of the Treasury evidencing payment of the requisite tax." ( citing 
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 9066 (2004))). 
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court's subsequent preemption decision regarding Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law. 66 
Second, the court clearly broadcast its straightforward understanding of Morales, and 
likewise previewed its disposition towards arguments against preemption advocated 
by the Attorney General in N.H. Motor Transport IV, which essentially echoed those 
advanced by the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico (the Secretary) in defense of the excise tax collection regime challenged 
in United Parcel Service. 
The United Parcel Service court described UPS as being in the business of 
"offer[ing] door-to-door delivery service and the delivery of packages on an express 
or time-guaranteed basis." 67 Because of the complexity that inheres in UPS 's daily 
delivery of thousands of packages, and because UPS provides for refund of delivery 
charges for delayed deliveries, the court found that any regulatory scheme that causes 
"delays and disruptions" in the delivery of packages ipso facto affects UPS services. 68 
The court further reasoned that Puerto Rico's excise tax collection scheme not only 
"refers to" but also "has a forbidden significant effect on UPS's prices, routes, or 
services" to the extent that it mandates suspension of package deliveries under certain 
circumstances, levies fines for noncompliance, 69 and imposes undue costs on UPS's 
business. 70 
Having thus adopted wholesale the broad ERISA-based Morales standard, the 
United Parcel Service court rather summarily dismissed the Secretary's arguments that, 
on the one hand, intervening material changes in ERISA law mandated a narrower 
interpretation ofFAAAA preemption,7 1 and on the other that UPS had not overcome 
66. Circuit Judge Howard authored the unanimous opinions in both United Parcel Service and NH. 
Motor Transport JV. 
67. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 325. 
68. Id. at 336. 
69. See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 9066 (2004): 
No sea, air or land carrier who has taxable items in custody may deliver them to the 
consignee or person properly claiming them, unless the person presents a certificate from 
the Secretary authorizing its delivery. Any carrier who violates this provision shall be 
subject to the imposition ofan administrative fine and the payment of the tax corresponding 
to said articles, including surcharges and interest computed from the date of introduction 
of the article, when the taxpayer does not make such payment. 
70. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 335-36. 
7 I. Id. at 335 n.19. The Secretary cited, as examples ofrestrictions on ERISA's preemptive reach, New 
York State Conference of Blue Cross &Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), and 
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc., 5 I 9 U.S. 316 
(I 997). In Travelers, the Court held that New York State's regulation of hospital surcharges was neither 
related to nor connected to ERISA plans. Even though the differential rates charged to variously insured 
patients encouraged ERISA plans to purchase insurance from preferred insurers, the "indirect economic 
influence" of the surcharge did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as 
a regulation of an ERISA plan itself." Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. In Dillingham, the Court likewise found 
that a state regulation that required payment of prevailing wages to employees in non-state approved 
apprenticeship programs but allowed lower pay to those in state-approved programs, was not preempted 
by ERISA because it only "alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans." 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316 at 334. When transposed from the ERISA to the FAAAA context-a 
transposition invited by the Morales Court's reading of the statutes' preemptive standards in pari 
materia-these cases indicate that F AAAA preemption analysis may very well be different when a carrier 
that is supposedly suffering "significant forbidden effects" retains a choice whether or not to continue 
suffering them. 
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the properly applicable presumption against federal preemption of Commonwealth 
taxation laws. In rejecting the Secretary's first argument, the court explained that the 
courts of appeals are not free to cobble together binding precedent from other areas of 
the law. Absent a new holding from the Supreme Court that resolves an apparent 
inconsistency owing to divergent interpretations of identical statutory language, the 
lower courts will refuse to resolve such an inconsistency on theirown initiative.72 With 
regard to the presumption against preemption, the United Parcel Service court 
acknowledged that such a presumption exists, but denied the propriety ofits imposition 
in that case. 73 The court reminded the Secretary that the presumption attaches when 
"Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states."74 Under those 
circumstances, preemption analysis "start[ s] with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded." 75 In response to the Secretary's 
argument that the appropriate field was state taxation, the court decided the 
presumption did not apply because the appropriate field was air transportation, one in 
which Congress enjoys a "significant-and undisputed-presence." 76 
Ill. MAINE'S TOBACCO DELIVERY LAW 
Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law77 was enacted in June 2003, supplementing an 
existing legislative scheme regarding retail tobacco sales in an effort "to limit the 
consumption of tobacco products by minors, and to track delivery sales in order to 
acquire lost tax revenue." 78 The amendments to existing law effected by the Tobacco 
Delivery Law represent the Maine Legislature's response to two significant 
consequences of the growth in Internet retail sales of tobacco products. First, the 
state's retail licensing requirements, prohibition of over-the-counter sales to minors, 
and attendant enforcement mechanisms-although reasonably successful at curbing 
minors' access to tobacco through standard retail channels79-were powerless to stem 
72. United Parcel Serv., 3 18 F .3d at 335 n.19 ("If developments in pension law have undercut holdings 
in air-transportation law, it is for the Supreme Court itself to make the adjustment. Our marching orders 
are clear: follow decisions until the Supreme Court overrules them." (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa 
Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.))). 
73. Id. at 336. 
74. Id. (citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)). 
75. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
76. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 336. What the United Parcel Service court neglects to explain 
is the fate of the presumption when federal law, promulgated in a field traditionally occupied by Congress, 
is brandished as a shield by private parties challenging the validity of state law promulgated in fields within 
the traditional ambit of the states. 
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1551, 1555-C & -D (West 2004). 
78. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport I), 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D. Me. 
2004) ( citing Committee File of the Committee on Health and Human Services and Committee on Taxation 
on "An Act to Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Tobacco 
Products to Minors" (Apr. 29, 2003)). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1551 (3) (West 2004) 
("'Tobacco products' includes any form of tobacco and any material or device used in the smoking, 
chewing or other form of tobacco consumption, including cigarette papers and pipes."). 
79. See N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 203 (D. Me. 2005) ("As a result of these 
efforts, Maine's tobacco addiction rates have plummeted among youth .... " (quoting Testimony of Dora 
Anne Mills, Director, Bureau of Health, Department of Human Services)); see also 1995 ME. LAWS 470 
§ 17, which provided: 
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the flow oflnternet tobacco delivered directly to minors' homes. 80 Second, Internet 
tobacco purchases-by consumers of any age-were not subject to state tax, causing 
losses of ''tremendous tax revenues as a result of tax free sales by unlicensed 
companies. "81 The Tobacco Delivery Law thus included measures to restrict delivery 
of tobacco to minors,82 facilitate collection of applicable state taxes directly from 
consumers, 83 and provide for the seizure of contraband cigarettes. 84 
A. Interdiction of Sales to Minors 
In order to understand the mechanisms that the Tobacco Delivery Law employs 
to restrict Internet sales of tobacco products to minors, it is first necessary to 
understand the components of an Internet retail tobacco transaction as contemplated 
by Maine's law. The Tobacco Delivery Law clearly defines "delivery sale" 85 as 
including only those sales (I) to consumers who are not licensed distributors or 
retailers, (2) of tobacco products that are delivered by common carriers of packages, 
including the United States Post Office.86 In order for an Internet retailer to 
accomplish a lawful delivery sale, that retailer must take certain measures, the linchpin 
of which is found at section l 555-C(3)(C) (the Age Verification Provision). 87 The Age 
To the extent that funds are available, the Department of Human Services and the Office of 
Substance Abuse shall collaboratively coordinate, develop and implement programs to 
educate retailers, schools, retail clerks, juveniles and the general public about the laws 
relating to cigarette sales to, and purchases by,juveniles, the consequences of violating those 
laws and the consequences of using tobacco products. 
80. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2006). 
81. Id. (citing Testimony of Representative Glen Cummings Before the Joint Standing Committee on 
Health & Human Services, Apr. 29, 2003). 
82. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(3)(C) (West 2004) (requiring Internet retailers to demand 
that delivery companies both deliver tobacco products only to the purchaser/addressee and verify the age 
of the purchaser/addressee). 
83. Id. § 15 55-C( 4) (referencing the federal Jenkins Act reporting regime and requiring Internet retailers 
to report all delivery sales, including purchaser identity and quantity and brand of tobacco sold, to the 
Department of Administrative and Financial Services, Bureau of Revenue Services); see also supra note 
10 (discussing the Jenkins Act). 
84. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-0(6) (West 2004) (defining as contraband subject to seizure 
all tobacco products purchased from unlicensed retailers). 
85. Id. § 1551 (1-8): 
"Delivery sale" means a sale of tobacco products to a consumer in this State when: 
A. The purchaser submits the order for the sale by means of telephonic or other electronic 
method of voice transmission, the Internet or any delivery service; or 
B. The tobacco products are delivered by use of a delivery service. 
A sale to a person who is not licensed as a tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer is a 
delivery sale. 
86. See id. § 1551 (1-C) ('"Delivery service' means a person, including the United States Postal Service, 
who is engaged in the commercial delivery ofletters, packages or other containers."). 
87. See id. § 1555-C(J): 
Requirements for shipping a delivery sale. The following provisions apply to a tobacco 
retailer shipping tobacco products pursuant to a delivery sale. 
A. Prior to shipping, the tobacco retailer shall provide to the delivery service the age of the 
purchaser .... 
B. The tobacco retailer shall clearly mark the outside of the package of tobacco products 
to be shipped to indicate that the contents are tobacco products and to show the name and 
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Verification Provision requires that "[t]he tobacco retailer shall utilize a delivery 
service" that will ensure the purchaser of the product is the addressee, and that the 
addressee is at least eighteen years old-a determination that requires on-delivery 
inspection of government-issued photographic identification. 
Notably, however, the only private actor subject to liability for violation of the 
delivery sale requirements is the tobacco retailer. 88 Under no factual scenario could 
a delivery service be sanctioned under these provisions. Even if an Internet retailer 
were to utilize a delivery service that did not provide the age verification services that 
the retailer is required by law to demand as a matter of private contract, and the 
illegally shipped tobacco products are thus deemed contraband subject to forfeiture, 
the delivery service is nonetheless held harmless. 89 Accordingly, were Maine allowed 
to enforce these delivery sale requirements, the probable result would be multiple civil 
judgments against interstate Internet retailers whose only conceivable defense-lack 
of personal jurisdiction-would likely be unavailing under Maine's long-arm statute. 90 
Assuming the legislature knew that interstate common carriers such as UPS did not 
offer the age verification services that retailers are required by law to demand, the 
intended effect of these provisions is clear: discourage Internet retailers from accepting 
Maine residents' orders for delivery sales by threatening civil penalties that increase 
in magnitude upon multiple violations. 
B. Revenue-Capture Provisions 
As noted above, the Tobacco Delivery Law is meant not only to restrict minors' 
access to tobacco products, but also to collect lost tax revenue on tobacco sales to 
Maine residents notwithstanding their ages. The sale reporting requirements of section 
State of Maine tobacco license number of the tobacco retailer. 
C. The tobacco retailer shall utilize a delivery service that imposes the following 
requirements: 
(I) The purchaser must be the addressee; 
(2) The addressee must be of legal age to purchase tobacco products and must sign 
for the package; and 
(3) If the addressee is under [twenty-seven] years of age, the addressee must show 
valid government-issued identification that contains a photograph of the addressee and 
indicates that the addressee is of legal age to purchase tobacco products. 
D. The delivery instructions must clearly indicate the requirements of this subsection and 
must declare that state Jaw requires compliance with the requirements. 
E. A person who violates this subsection commits a civil violation for which a fine of not 
less than $50 and not more than $1,500 may be adjudged for each violation. 
F. A person who violates this subsection after having been previously adjudicated as 
violating this subsection ... commits a civil violation for which a fine of not Jess than 
$ I ,000 and not more than $5,000 may be adjudged. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. § 1555-C(?) ("Any tobacco product sold or attempted to be sold in a delivery sale that does not 
meet the requirements of this section is deemed to be contraband and is subject to forfeiture .... "). 
90. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (West 2004) (deeming that a person who transacts 
business within Maine has submitted to personal jurisdiction); see also Rita H. Logan, Reaching into 
Cyberspace with Maine's Long-Arm Statute, 14 ME. B.J. 306, 309 (1999) (speculating how the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court will perform jurisdictional contacts analysis under the statute in the context of 
Internet business transactions). 
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1555-C(4), 91 which require retailers to report all delivery sales to state tax authorities 
and provide civil penalties for failure to so report, are a clear attempt to recoup unpaid 
tobacco taxes directly from consumers in a manner consistent with the Jenkins Act.92 
In contrast, section 1555-D of the Tobacco Delivery Law (the Proscribed Delivery 
Provision), 93 which subjects delivery services under contract with unlicensed retailers 
to liability for knowingly transporting tobacco products, stands on what is perhaps a 
less legitimate ground. Tobacco retailers who are unlicensed are already transacting 
unlawful business with Maine consumers and are subject to criminal-as opposed to 
civil-sanction for doing so.94 It is therefore not unexpected that Maine would deem 
all products sold by unlicensed retailers contraband and subject to forfeiture. 95 In 
addition, iflicensed retailers consistently report their delivery sales to the state revenue 
service ( as is likely the case), Maine should expect to increase licensing 96 as well as tax 
revenues by imposing quasi-co-conspirator liability on carriers that serve unlicensed 
retailers. However, the Proscribed Delivery Provision cannot reasonably be justified-
as can the Age Verification Provision or the Jenkins Act reporting requirements-by 
a narrow appeal to Maine's compelling interests in protecting citizen health or 
augmenting the public fisc. At best, it can be characterized as merely an attempt to 
bootstrap the pre-existing scheme to chill the unlicensed Internet tobacco trade. At 
worst, it appears to be an arguably draconian backlash against the carriers, actors who 
constitute the broadest and most conspicuous enforcement target when compared to 
rogue e-commerce retailers and their widely-dispersed customer base. 
9 I . See supra note 83. 
92. See supra notes IO and 83; see also ME. REVENUE SERVS.-SALES, FUEL & SPECIAL TAX DIV., 
INSTRUCTIONAL BULLETIN: TOBACCO PRODUCTS 3 (2006) ("Individual purchasers and users of tobacco 
products ... must report tobacco products purchases that have not previously been taxed in Maine (for 
example, imports from other states or countries and purchases made over the Internet)."), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/revenue/othertaxes/tobacco/FinalOTPBulletin073106.pdf. 
93. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 1555-D (West 2004): 
A person may not knowingly transport or cause to be delivered to a person in this State a 
tobacco product purchased from a person who is not licensed as a tobacco retailer in this 
State, except that this provision does not apply to the transportation or delivery of tobacco 
products to a licensed tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer. A person is deemed to know 
that a package contains a tobacco product if the package is marked in accordance with the 
requirements of section I 555-C, subsection 3, paragraph B or if the person receives the 
package from a person listed as an unlicensed tobacco retailer by the Attorney General under 
this section. 
94. See id. § 1555-C(l) (requiring that retailers who accept and fill orders for delivery sales of tobacco 
products acquire retail tobacco license pursuant to title 22, section 1551-A(l) of the Maine Revised 
Statutes); see also id. § I 554-8(3) (defining unlicensed retail sale of tobacco products a strict liability Class 
E crime under title 17-A, section 34(4-A) of the Maine Revised Statutes). 
95. See id.§ 1555-0(6) ("[A]ny tobacco product sold or attempted to be sold in a delivery sale [by an 
unlicensed tobacco retailer] is deemed to be contraband and is subject to forfeiture .... "). 
96. See I 0-144-203 ME. CODER. § 3 (2006) (providing for maximum annual retail tobacco license fee 
of$150). 
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IV. THEN.H. MOTOR TRANSPORTLITIGATION 
A. N.H. Motor Transport I, II & III 
[Vol. 59:2 
New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, Massachusetts Motor 
Transportation Association, Inc., and Vermont Truck and Bus Association, Inc., "non-
profit trade associations whose members are in the interstate transportation business," 97 
filed suit in October of 2003, seeking a declaration from the district court that the Age 
Verification Provision and the Proscribed Delivery Provision are preempted by the 
FAAAA.9& 
The parties' litigation strategy in the district court involved three discrete rounds 
of summary judgment briefing. In the first (N.H. Motor Transport I), plaintiffs 
unsuccessfully alleged a theory of "facial" preemption. 99 In the second (N.H. Motor 
Transport JI), the Maine Attorney General moved to dismiss for lack of standing and 
for summary judgmentthat the Tobacco Delivery Law was not "facially" preempted. 100 
In the third (N.H. Motor Transport Ill), both parties moved for summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs' ultimately successful "as-applied" challenge. 101 
The associations' "bifurcated summary judgment strategy" 102-supposedly based 
on the First Circuit's interpretation of Morales in United Parcel Service-injected into 
the litigation an arguably distracting procedural complication. 103 In N.H. Motor 
Transport I, the court confirmed that the appropriate standard under which the 
associations' challenge was to be decided was that announced by the First Circuit in 
United Parcel Service: "A sufficient nexus [ for preemption] exists if the law expressly 
references the [motor] carrier's prices, routes or services, or has a 'forbidden 
97. N.H. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D. Me. 2004). 
98. Id. at 40-41. 
99. Id. at 46 (denying summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law is "facially" preempted). 
100. N.H. MotorTransp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport JI), 324 F. Supp. 2d 231,232 (D. Me. 
2004) (granting summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law is not "facially'' preempted but holding 
that plaintiff associations have standing to mount an "as-applied" challenge). 
IO I. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 3 77 F. Supp. 2d 197,220 (D. Me. 2005)(granting plaintiff associations' 
"as-applied" challenge, and holding that the Age Verification Provision and the Proscribed Delivery 
Provision are preempted, but section 1555-C(3)(A) is not). 
102. N.H. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
103. Id. In his second summary judgment disposition, United States District Judge Homby described 
one consequence of the morass as follows: 
I am perplexed by the carrier associations' argument [raised in opposition to the Attorney 
General's motion for summary judgment regarding facial preemption] that "there is no 
'Facial Preemption Claim' in the Complaint on which the Attorney General could be granted 
judgment." To be sure, the Complaint states two causes of action (under the Supremacy 
Clause and the Declaratory Relief Act), and neither is entitled "Facial Challenge." But the 
Complaint also asserts that the Maine provisions are preempted by federal law because they 
"expressly refer to" and "have a significant effect on" motor carrier services. It was the 
carrier associations who embarked upon a bifurcated summary judgment strategy .... 
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, in N.H. Motor Transport Ill, Judge Homby noted that commentators 
have addressed the substantial confusion wrought by the "facial" and "as-applied" labels attached to suits 
that challenge the validity of statutes. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 20 I n.9 ( citing Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 
1335-41 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879-83 
(2005)). 
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significant effect upon the same. "' 104 This standard for F AAAA preemption, extracted 
from the Morales Court's interpretation of the ADA, may appear to require, or at least 
invite, the two-stage analysis pursued by the associations in their challenge to the 
Tobacco Delivery Law. However, as is clear from the absence of economic data 
substantiating the Morales Court's determination of"forbidden significant effect,"J05 
the second avenue to F AAAA preemption is equally susceptible to determination under 
a "facial" challenge. In Morales, the Court found that the NAAG guidelines had a 
"forbidden significant effect" on airline rates simply as a matter of economic logic, 
without reference to its "as-applied" effect. 106 Such a standard, as the Morales dissent 
hinted, necessarily breeds this kind of confusion, especially when applied in the context 
of summary judgment disposition. io7 Nonetheless, the associations proceeded under this 
theory, and N.H Motor Transport l II & III demonstrate its patent inefficiency. 
An unintended and ultimately immaterial effect on the litigation of the associa-
tions' bifurcated summary judgment strategy was that in granting the associations' "as-
applied" summary judgment motion in N.H Motor Transport III, District Judge 
Homby withdrew the presumption against preemption 108 he had applied in N.H. Motor 
Transport I. 109 In addition to being motivated by a mistaken reading of Morales-that 
the alternative avenues to F AAAA preemption are inherently different inquiries-the 
associations' bifurcated approach may also be characterized as a tactic to avoid, or at 
least postpone, the exposure of the identities of the corporate interests the associations 
represent. 110 By first moving for summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law 
104. N.H. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2dat42 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 
318 F.3d 323,334 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
105. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1992); see also supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
106. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388-89. 
107. Id. at 427 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ("[Summary]judgment ... 
shall be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."). Under the substantive law ofF AAAA preemption, because 
the necessity of adducing "material facts" is almost wholly erased, and a "genuine issue" as to them 
therefore rendered impossible to raise, F AAAA preemption challenges are arguably ill-suited to the 
awkward "facial" and "as-applied" labels invoked by the plaintiff associations in their challenge to the 
Tobacco Delivery Law. 
108. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74-75 n.10 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing the substantial 
uncertainty surrounding the application of the presumption, comparing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (stating that preemption analysis starts "with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress") with United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (presumption 
inapplicable where "the State legislates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal 
presence")). For a different articulation of the predicate to the presumption, see United Parcel Service v. 
Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 336 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The presumption [against preemption] only arises ... 
if Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states."). As is evident in N.H. Motor 
Transport III and JV, the advantage of the presumption to the Attorney General was nullified, whether or 
not it was applied. 
109. N.H. Motor Transport III, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 206 ("I conclude that I erred in my analysis in my 
earlier decision on the associations' facial motion for summary judgment, where I applied the presumption 
against preemption .... [However,] [e]ven ifl continued to apply the presumption, I would find Maine's 
Tobacco Delivery Law preempted .... "). 
110. N.H. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d 23 I, 237 n.7 (D. Me. 2004) ("At oral argument ... the 
plaintiffs' lawyer advanced reasons why the associations are the party plaintiffs, one of those being that it 
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is "facially" preempted, the associations theoretically stood to achieve the goal of its 
members without "going into the facts." 111 However, because the N.H. Motor 
Transport I court denied their "facial" challenge, 112 the associations were forced to 
adopt their back-up position: proof of the Tobacco Delivery Law's "significant 
forbidden effect" on carrier services "as-applied" to UPS, one of their many 
constituents. 113 
Having prevailed in N.H. Motor Transport I, the Attorney General in N.H. Motor 
Transport II sought to dismiss the associations' suit for lack of standing, hoping to 
fend off the associations' promised "as-applied" attack. 114 The Attorney General's 
argument was based on the three-part associational standing test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 115 which 
provides: 
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim 
asserted nor the reliefrequested requires the participation of individual members in 
the lawsuit.116 
The Attorney General focused on the third Hunt prong and argued that the 
contemplated "as-applied" challenge, because of its fact-intensive nature, would 
require the participation of UPS, the party who controls all relevant discoverable 
material. 117 The court, however, found the Attorney General's arguments to be without 
merit and held the third Hunt prong required an analysis not of discovery burdens, but 
rather of the "nature of relief requested." 118 The court reasoned that associational 
standing was appropriate because the associations were seeking injunctive relief, which 
can be disadvantageous for a particular company to challenge a tobacco-regulating law."); see also NH. 
Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 81 n.13 (noting that research failed to uncover any FAAAA challenge to 
any state law banning transport of contraband other than tobacco, and inviting reflection on Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle's following conceit: "Detective Gregory: 'Is there any other point to which you would wish 
to draw my attention?' Sherlock Holmes: 'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.' Gregory: 
'The dog did nothing in the night-time.' Holmes: 'That was the curious incident."' SIR ARTHUR CONAN 
DOYLE, Silver Blaze (1890), in II THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES (William S. Baring-Gould ed., 
1967)). 
111. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at233 (quoting Transcript ofConf. of Counsel at 3,NH. 
Motor Transport IL 324 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Me. 2004) (No. 03-0178)). 
112. NH. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42-44 (D. Me. 2004) (applying presumption against 
preemption and holding that ( 1) because the Age Verification Provision applies to retailers and not delivery 
companies, and does not "expressly reference[] ... [motor] carrier's prices, routes or services," it is not 
"facially preempted," and (2) the Proscribed Delivery Provision, although it expressly refers to carrier 
services, is likewise not "facially" preempted because it is a generally applicable prohibition on 
transportation of contraband). 
I 13. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 235. 
114. Id. at 232. 
115. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
116. Id. at 343. 
117. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 234-35. 
118. Id. at 236 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 51 l (1975)). 
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"usually inures to the benefit of all members injured,"' 19 as opposed to damages, where 
"individualized proof' is required. 120 
After the N.H. Motor Transport II court affirmed that they had standing to 
proceed, the associations moved for summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law 
was preempted "as-applied" to UPS. Curiously, in granting the associations' second 
motion, the N.H. Motor Transport III court reversed its prior holding that the 
Proscribed Delivery Provision was not facially preempted by the F AAAA. 121 
Nonetheless, the court went on to explain that the Proscribed Delivery Provision 
"would be preempted because ... it also has a forbidden significant effect on carriers' 
services" to the extent it requires UPS to inspect packages in transit, and to compare 
labels with lists of licensed tobacco retailers provided by the Attorney General. 122 
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of Morales, the court concluded "that there is no need 
for empirical studies to prove that a change in the normal, uniform procedure, such as 
removing the package from the delivery process . . . would cause a delay in the 
process. " 123 
Turning its attention to section l 555-C(3)(A) and the Age Verification Provision, 
the court concluded that because neither provision "impose[ s] any direct obligations 
on carriers, and carriers face no penalties under them" they should be subjected to 
"forbidden significant effect" rather than "express reference" analysis. 124 Although the 
court appeared to struggle with this interruption in the causal link between state 
legislative mandate and carrier services, it concluded that the provision is preempted: 
The analysis is similar to that for [the Proscribed Delivery Provision]. Like that 
section, [the Age Verification Provision] impermissibly affects carriers' services 
because it results in a carrier (who wishes to participate in this commerce) having to 
identify the contents of the package to determine whether it must impose the delivery 
conditions listed in the statute. Imposing these conditions on delivery causes carriers' 
drivers to alter their delivery practices for packages in Maine .... 125 
119. Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 515). 
120. Id. (rejecting the Attorney General's argument that an "as-applied" challenge is "akin to proving 
damages"). 
121. N.H. Motor Transport JJJ, 377 F. Supp. 2d I 97,211 (D. Me. 2005) ("Section 1555-D thus expressly 
references carriers' services. Under the analysis of Morales and UPS, that is enough to result in 
preemption. This conclusion differs from what I said in my preliminary rulings. My conclusion has 
changed because I no longer apply the presumption against preemption .... "). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 213 n.72. The court reached the same conclusion after analyzing the associations' challenge 
to the Age Verification Provision: 
Despite the Attorney General's argument that, because of dollar amounts, I should consider 
the effects here not sufficient to reach the 'significant' level of the 'forbidden significant 
effect' standard, I conclude that no more is required. Morales should not be read to require 
courts to assess the actual competitiveness of a particular market to determine when effects 
reach the level of significance. For the same reason, I reject the Attorney General's 
argument that UPS was required to do more empirical research or industrial engineering 
studies .... Therefore, I do not resolve the parties' disagreement over whether an additional 
two seconds are really necessary to examine every package coming to Maine .... 
Id. at 216 n.92. 
124. Id. at 215. 
125. Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
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However, the court concluded that section 1555-C(3)(A), which requires a retailer to 
supply the carrier with purchaser age information, is not preempted to the extent "the 
carrier does not have to do anything with [the] information." 126 
The NH. Motor Transport III court ultimately entered declaratory judgment that 
the Age Verification and Proscribed Delivery provisions are preempted and invited the 
parties to submit a proposed injunction that would completely enjoin enforcement of 
the former, but would limit the injunction regarding the latter only as against motor and 
air/ground carriers. 127 In its conclusion the court noted that, at least with regard to the 
Age Verification Provision, "unless a carrier is willing to make the required 
guarantees, it is foreclosed from this part of the transportation market." 128 
B. N.H. Motor Transport IV 
The Attorney General appealed not only from the NH. Motor Transport III 
court's ultimate preemption ruling, 129 but also from the NH. Motor Transport II court's 
standing ruling. 130 In addition, the Attorney General argued that the associations' case 
became moot while on appeal because UPS had settled 131 "an enforcement action 
brought by the New York Attorney General under a New York law restricting the 
ability of carriers to deliver cigarettes to consumers." 132 As a consequence of this 
settlement, the Attorney General argued, UPS had altered its business practices and 
policies to such an extent that it was no longer engaged in the activities proscribed by 
the Tobacco Delivery Law.133 Although the NH. Transport IV court recognized that 
126. Id. at 217. 
127. Id. at 218. 
128. Id. at 219. For this statement to be true, it must be assumed that out-of-state retailers will comply 
with the Tobacco Delivery Law and require that carriers provide the Age Verification service. To the extent 
some of these foreign retailers are unlicensed and are thus operating in violation of Maine tobacco laws 
already, the strength of this assumption is questionable. Moreover, as noted above, the court fails to analyze 
whether or not the compensation a carrier could demand for making the required guarantees would suffice 
to render the forbidden effect insignificant for F AAAA preemption purposes. 
129. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74 (1st. Cir. 2006). 
130. See id. at 71. In affirming the lower court's standing ruling, the NH. Motor Transport IV court 
noted that the operative language of the F AAAA preemption provisions essentially rendered the case ideal 
for association standing. Id. at 72. The court reasoned that because the F AAAA provisions, 49 U .S.C. §§ 
14501(c) and 41713(b)(4)(A), preempt state laws that relate to a price, route or service of"any motor 
carrier" or "an air carrier," respectively, association standing was eminently appropriate: the associations 
can prevail on their preemption claim "by establishing that the challenged provisions of the Tobacco 
Delivery Law have a forbidden significant effect on one carrier." Id. at 72-73. 
131. The N.H. Motor Transport III summary judgment order was entered on May 27, 2005. NH. Motor 
Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 220. The Assurance of Discontinuance between UPS and the Attorney 
General of the State of New York was executed on October 21, 2005. Assurance of Discontinuance in the 
Matter of United Parcel Service, Inc. 20 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 
2005/oct/9tiupsaodfinal.oct.pdf [hereinafter UPS Settlement]. 
132. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73. The New York Health Law cited by the court provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to knowingly transport cigarettes to 
any person in this state reasonably believed by such carrier to be other than [ a licensed tax 
agent or wholesale dealer, an export warehouse proprietor, or an officer, employee or agent 
of the government of the United States or New York State]. 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 1399-11(2) (McKinney 2001). 
133. Reply BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 4, NH. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006) 
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"Article III considerations require that an actual case or controversy exist between the 
parties throughout the course of the litigation," 134 the court explained that the party 
who argues the absence of such a case or controversy "must show that the court cannot 
grant any 'effectual relief whatever' to its opponent." 135 Analysis of the N.H. 
Transport IV court's rather perfunctory finding that the Attorney General had not met 
"this heavy burden" 136 of establishing mootness illustrates the unique and difficult 
issues raised by the associations' bifurcated summary judgment strategy and the 
theories on which the associations ultimately prevailed. 
The UPS Settlement provides, in relevant part: 
4. [N.Y. Pub. Health Law section 1399-11] became effective on or about April 10, 
2003 (the "Implementation Date") .... 
10. UPS represents that, after the Implementation Date, the UPS Tariff and UPS' s 
Terms and Conditions, which describe the terms and conditions pursuant to which 
UPS provides package delivery services for shippers, and together form parts of the 
UPS shipping contract, were amended to provide in pertinent part: "Shippers are 
prohibited from shipping, and no service shall be rendered in the transportation of, 
any tobacco products that shippers are not authorized to ship under applicable state 
law or that are addressed to recipients not authorized to receive such shipments under 
applicable law." ... 
15. UPS has made a business decision to adopt a formal policy expressly prohibiting 
the shipment of cigarettes to individual consumers in the United States while still 
permitting the lawful shipment of cigarettes to licensed tobacco businesses and other 
persons legally authorized to receive shipments of cigarettes ... 137 
The N.H. Transport IV court reasoned that because the UPS Settlement "applies 
only to the delivery of cigarettes" 138 and the Tobacco Delivery Law applies to a 
broader category of products, 139 UPS retained a "legally cognizable stake in the 
outcome" 140 of the appeal. 141 However, to the extent UPS agreed that "no service shall 
be rendered in the transportation of [] any tobacco products that shippers are not 
authorized to ship under applicable state law," 142 it is difficult to understand how the 
UPS Settlement failed to jeopardize the court's jurisdiction over the litigation. After 
all, the Proscribed Delivery Provision of the Tobacco Delivery Law makes illegal the 
(No. 05-2 l 36)("Now, without advising this Court, UPS has implemented a program effectively doing what 
Maine law mandates--checking packages and ensuring they are shipped by licensees-which obviously 
must have been studied and analyzed by UPS."). 
134. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73 (citing Ramirezv. Sanchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 100 (1st 
Cir. 2006)) ( emphasis added). 
135. Id. (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). 
136. Id. 
137. UPS Settlement, supra note 13 I, at 2-4. 
138. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73. 
139. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1551(3) (West 2004) ('"Tobacco products' includes any form 
of tobacco and any material or device used in the smoking, chewing or other form of tobacco consumption, 
including cigarette papers and pipes."). 
140. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73 (quoting Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d 44, 46 (1st 
Cir. 2006)). 
141. Id. at 74 ("Because enjoining the challenged provisions would permit UPS to deliver all tobacco 
products, effectual reliefremains available."). 
142. UPS Settlement, supra note 131, at 4. 
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shipment of a "tobacco product" from an unlicensed tobacco retailer. 143 Unlicensed 
retailers are, by definition, not authorized to sell tobacco products in Maine. 144 
Accordingly, UPS's agreement to discontinue servicing "shippers [that] are not 
authorized to ship under applicable state law" appears to render moot the associations' 
claim that the Proscribed Delivery Provision is preempted by the F AAAA, or as the 
Attorney General argued in the alternative, no longer ripe for decision. 145 
By failing to parse exactly what remained ofUPS's stake in the outcome of the 
appeal before it, the N.H. Motor Transport IV court avoided articulating the only 
possible scenario under which UPS remained adversely affected by the Tobacco 
Delivery Law: delivery sale of non-cigarette tobacco products by a licensed retailer. 
Under such a scenario, only the Age Verification Provision requirements attach. UPS 
would thus have no legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the appeal of that 
portion of the N.H. Motor Transport III court's ruling that the Proscribed Delivery 
Provision was preempted. 
It is plausible that theN.H. Motor Transport IV court's failure to explicitly analyze 
this issue represents its reluctance to acknowledge that in the field of F AAAA 
preemption much-perhaps too much-appears to tum on the business decisions of a 
carrier arguing preemption. On the one hand, arguably implicit in the court's reasoning 
is the following logic: even if UPS may no longer have been adversely affected by the 
Proscribed Delivery Provision, another motor carrier that both (1) enjoyed FAAAA 
protection from artificial state regulation and (2) had not made a similar decision to 
discontinue certain service, would, in theory, have remained adversely affected. Thus, 
to the extent the associations were pleading preemption on behalf of all of their 
members-while singling out UPS for strategic purposes-the associations retained 
a cognizable stake in the appeal. On the other hand, the court might have considered 
that because the Proscribed Delivery Provision expressly references carrier services, 
it is facially preempted by the F AAAA, 146 and the existence vel non of adverse effects 
on UPS, or any carrier for that matter, is irrelevant. However, because this latter 
explanation is inconsistent with the N.H. Motor Transport IV court's ultimate finding 
143. See supra note 93. 
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(l) (West 2004) ("It is unlawful for any person to accept an 
order for a delivery sale of tobacco products to a consumer in the State unless that person is licensed under 
this chapter as a tobacco retailer."). 
145. See ReplyBriefofDefendant-Appellant at 11 n.7, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 
2006) (No. 05-2136) ("Also applicable here is the doctrine that to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a 
statute, the plaintiff at least must allege that it has 'an intention to engage in a course of conduct ... 
proscribed by the statute."') (quoting Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'! Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(I 979)). This conclusion is only buttressed by the UPS Terms and Conditions, which currently provide: 
"Packages containing tobacco or tobacco products, as those terms are variously defined under applicable 
state law ('Tobacco Product Shipments'), are accepted for transportation only from shippers who are 
licensed and authorized to ship tobacco and tobacco products pursuant to applicable laws." UPS Terms 
and Conditions of Service for Customers Located in the 48 Contiguous States, Alaska and Hawaii at 4 
(Nov. I, 2006), available at http://www.ups.com/media/en/terms_service_l lOl2006.pdf. Moreover, 
because the Attorney General is required by title 22, section 1555-D( I) of the Maine Revised Statutes to 
"provide to a delivery service lists of licensed tobacco retailers and known unlicensed tobacco retailers," 
the Tobacco Delivery Law in fact facilitates UPS's compliance with its own Terms and Conditions and the 
UPS Settlement. 
146. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,388 (1992); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. 
Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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that half of the Proscribed Delivery Provision is preempted neither facially nor as-
applied, 147 readers are left to ponder the true remaining stake the associations have with 
regard to the Proscribed Delivery Provision. 
Having thus disposed of the two threshold jurisdictional issues of mootness and 
standing, the court proceeded to the merits of the Attorney General's appeal. The 
Attorney General articulated two principal arguments for reversal. 148 Concentrating 
first on the F AAAA itself, the Attorney General argued that the F AAAA "preempts 
only state laws that impose traditional economic regulation on carriers." 149 Although 
the court acknowledged that the legislative history of the F AAAA supported this 
argument, 150 the Attorney General was reminded that "the legislative history cannot 
trump the statute's text." 151 Although this may be true, or at least comport with the 
Morales majority's remarks on the subject, 152 there is a significant passage in the 
legislative history that the N.H. Motor Transport IV court partially ignored. In a 
section entitled "Background and statement of purpose," the House Conference Report 
on the F AAAA explains: 
Currently, 41 jurisdictions regulate, in varying degrees, intrastate prices, routes 
and services of motor carriers. The jurisdictions which do not regulate are: Alaska, 
Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Vermont and Wisconsin. 
Typical forms of regulation include entry controls, tariff filing and price 
regulation, and types of commodities carried. 153 
147. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 81 (!st Cir. 2006) ("[W]hile Maine may ban a carrier from 
knowingly transporting contraband tobacco products, it may not dictate the procedures that a carrier should 
employ to locate these products in its delivery chain."). 
148. Id. at 74-78. 
149. Id. at 74. See also 8riefofDefendant-Appellant at 39-41 & n. 10, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 
F.3d 66 ( I st Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2136). 
150. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 77. 
151. Id. 
152. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 (I 992) ("[L]egislative history 
need not confirm the details of changes in the law effected by statutory language before we will interpret 
that language according to its natural meaning."). 
153. H.R. REP. NO. 103-677, at 86 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1758. 
The N.H. Motor Transport IV cited the last sentence but not the first two. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 
F.3d at 77. Taking the conferees' remarks to indicate that then-existing Maine laws were not the sort 
Congress sought to preempt, the Attorney General provided the N.H. Motor Transport IV court with a list 
of such laws: 
7 M.R.S.A. § 3981, enacted at Maine P.L. 1987, c. 383, § 3 (regulating period of 
confinement and conditions for transportation of animals); 8 M.R.S.A. §§ 221, et seq., 
enacted at Maine P.L. 1985, c. 23, § 2 (prohibiting possession, sale or transport "in any 
conveyance" of fireworks "except as permitted by" state regulations); 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 8305-
06, originally enacted Maine P.L. 1979, c. 545, § 3 (prohibiting and regulating shipment of 
plants and trees); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1118 (transporting scheduled drugs); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 
554-8(2) (transferring handgun to minor); 17-A M.R.S.A. § I 00 I (I )(8), enacted at Maine 
P.L. 1975, c. 499, § I (prohibiting transport or sale of explosives without a permit); 28-A 
M.R.S.A. § 2081, enacted at Maine P.L. 1987, c. 45, § A, 4 (prohibiting furnishing, 
delivering, or giving liquor to a minor). 
8riefofDefendant-Appellant at 41 & n.10, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (No. 05-
2136). 
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Although it cannot be assumed that the conferees knew of all laws then in effect in 
Maine, this statement nonetheless suggests that there existed a class of state laws that 
did not contribute to the pernicious "patchwork ofregulation" 154 for which the F AAAA 
was the remedy. As noted above, the court refused to credit this suggestion. Indeed, 
were the court to have done so, it would arguably amount to a revision of the Morales 
test for FAAAA preemption. Not unlike the Secretary's argument in United Parcel 
Service, the Attorney General urged that such revision of Morales was not only 
permissible, but required by changes in the Supreme Court's ERISAjurisprudence that 
occurred subsequent to the Court's interpretation of ADA preemption in Morales. 155 
Again, not unlike the United Parcel Service court's response to the Secretary's 
arguments there made, 156 the NH. Motor Transport IV court rejected the Attorney 
General's proposal that Morales had been overruled by implication. 157 
The Attorney General's second argument for reversal was that neither the Age 
Verification Provision nor the Proscribed Delivery Provision was preempted by the 
F AAAA because neither "related to" carrier services. 158 As a point of departure for its 
analysis, the court cited the United Parcel Service court's definition of UPS's 
services 159 and characterization of the F AAAA's preemptive reach. 160 Operating under 
the Morales-United Parcel Service framework, the court found the Age Verification 
Provision "expressly references a carrier's service of providing the timely delivery of 
packages," 161 and is preempted by the FAAAA even though, as the Attorney General 
argued, only retailers are subject to liability for failing to abide its requirements. 162 The 
154. H.R. REP. No. 103-677, at 87 (!994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759. 
155. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 76; see also supra note 71. Perhaps the most notable post-
Morales pronouncement with respect to ERISA preemption was written by Justice Scalia in California 
Division of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Construction. Inc.: 
[A)pplying the "relate to" provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, 
since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything 
else. The statutory text provides an illusory test, unless the Court is willing to decree a 
degree of pre-emption that no sensible person could have intended-which it is not. 
I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply 
acknowledged that our first take on [ERIS A) was wrong; that the "relate to" clause of the 
pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify 
the field in which ordinary field pre-emption applies-namely, the field oflaws regulating 
"employee benefit plan[s] .... " 
5I9U.S.316, 335-36 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). It should also be noted that three F AAAA preemption 
cases, cited by the N.H. Motor Transport JV court and referenced infra, notes 173 and 174, saw fit to rely 
on Dillingham: Californians/or Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transport v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 
1184, I 189 (9th Cir. 1998); Robertson v. Liquor Control Board, 10 P.3d 1079, 1082-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2000); and Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188,208 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
156. See supra note 72. 
157. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 76. 
158. Id. at 74. 
159. Id. at 78. 
160. Id. at 78-79 ("'State laws and regulations having a connection with or reference to a ... carrier's 
... services are preempted under the [FAAAA]. A sufficient nexus exists if the law expressly references 
the ... carriers' ... services or has a forbidden significant effect on the same."') (quoting United Parcel 
Service v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (I st Cir. 2003)). 
161. Id. at 79. 
162. BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 57, N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d 66 (I st Cir. 2006) (No. 05-
2136). 
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court's analysis of the Age Verification Provision represents a reasoned hybrid of the 
awkward "facial" and "as-applied" labels deployed in the NH. Motor Transport III 
court; indeed, neither label is referenced at all. The court not only focused on the Age 
Verification Provision's express reference to UPS's delivery services, but also on the 
resulting delays their implementation would inevitably cause. 163 In response to the 
Attorney General's argument that the f AAAA does not preempt a state law that does 
not regulate carriers, but instead their delivery clients, the court noted that "[ e ]ither 
way[,] the state is employing its coercive power to police the method by which carriers 
provide services in [Maine]." 164 The court also rejected the Attorney General's 
argument that f AAAA preemption cannot occur under circumstances that are 
essentially created by a carrier's election to deal in contraband goods subject to the 
strictures of state law. 165 According to the court, carrier business decisions are 
immaterial in analysis off AAAA preemption; to hold otherwise would be to run afoul 
of"the f AAAA's goal of creating an environment in which '[s]ervice options will be 
dictated by the marketplace,' and not by state regulatory regimes." 166 
The court's analysis of the Proscribed Delivery Provision, though not markedly 
different, was substantially informed by the Supreme Court's instruction that "courts 
should 'not nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for ... a ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people. "' 167 
Accordingly, the court parsed the Proscribed Delivery Provision and found both a "ban 
[on] primary conduct" 168 and a method of proving violation thereof by imposition of 
"constructive knowledge" 169 upon a carrier under certain circumstances. 17° Citing the 
Morales Court's assurance that a broad interpretation off AAAA preemption does not 
foreclose all state actions that might apply to carriers, 171 the NH. Motor Transport IV 
163. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 79 ("Delays in searching for the purchaser, making multiple 
delivery attempts if the purchaser cannot be located, obtaining the purchaser's signature, and verifying the 
purchaser's age all could affect timely deliveries.") 
164. Id. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,230 (1963)). 
165. Id. at 80; see also BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 57, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2136). 
166. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 80 (quoting H.R. REP. 103-677 at 88 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), 
as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1760). 
167. Id. (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961,967 (2006)). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 81. 
170. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-D (West 2004): 
A person may not knowingly transport or cause to be delivered to a person in this State a 
tobacco product purchased from a person who is not licensed as a tobacco retailer in this 
State, except that this provision does not apply to the transportation or delivery of tobacco 
products to a licensed tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer. A person is deemed to know 
that a package contains a tobacco product if the package is marked in accordance with the 
requirements of section 1555-C, subsection 3, paragraph B or if the person receives the 
package from a person listed as an unlicensed tobacco retailer by the Attorney General 
under this section. 
Id. ( emphasis added to indicate the "constructive knowledge" component-the "second sentence"~fthe 
Proscribed Delivery Provision). 
171. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 80 ("[T]he Supreme Court explained that its broad 
interpretation of the statute's preemption provision did not place it 'on a road that leads to preemption of 
gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines."' (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 
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court decided Maine's requirement that carriers not "act as knowing accomplices in the 
illegal sale of tobacco products" 172 affects carrier services in a manner "'too tenuous' 
to warrant preemption. " 173 In reaching this conclusion, the court aligned itself with 
three other courts that have upheld other state laws proscribing transport of contraband 
cigarettes. 174 
Turning its attention to the "second sentence" of the Proscribed Delivery 
Provision, the court found it impermissibly "dictate[d] the procedures that a carrier 
should employ" to determine whether or not it was violating Maine's permissible ban 
on transport of contraband products. 175 The "second sentence" automatically subjects 
a carrier to liability for violation of the Proscribed Delivery Provision if it can be 
shown in an enforcement action that the carrier either (1) transported a package duly 
labeled 176 to contain tobacco products, or (2) serviced a retailer included on a list of 
unlicensed retailers maintained by the Attorney General and provided to carriers. 177 
Accordingly, the court found that a carrier wishing to avoid a finding of constructive 
knowledge under the statute "must specially inspect every package destined for 
delivery in Maine," and make sure to segregate and return all offending packages. 178 
The court decided that although the "second sentence" does "not expressly reference 
carrier services," it nevertheless "has the effect of forcing UPS to change its uniform 
package-processing procedures," and is therefore preempted by the F AAAA. 179 
Although the court was content to separate the Proscribed Delivery Provision into 
its constituent parts in an effort to save the first from preemption, it is reasonably clear 
that the Tobacco Delivery Law requires both to be in force if its overall goals are to 
be accomplished. After all, it is arguably impossible to prove that a carrier like UPS, 
"which delivers approximately 65,000 packages per day in Maine," 180 ever transports 
a package with knowledge of its contents. The "constructive knowledge" component 
is therefore essential to enforcement of the Proscribed Delivery Provision. 181 As 
374,390 (1992))). 
172. Id. at 80. 
173. Id. (quoting Californians for Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 
1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998)). But see supra text accompanying note 155. 
174. Id. at 81 (citing N.Y. State Motor Truck Ass'n v. Pataki, No. 03-CV-2386, 2004 WL 2937803, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004); Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188, 210-1 I (W.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Robertson v. Liquor Control Bd., 10 P.3d 1079, 1084-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). But see supra text 
accompanying note 155. 
175. Id. at 81. 
176. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(3)(B) (West 2004) ("The tobacco retailer shall clearly 
mark the outside of the package of tobacco products to be shipped to indicate that the contents are tobacco 
products and to show the name and State of Maine tobacco license number of the tobacco retailer."). 
177. See supra note 170. 
178. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 8 I. 
179. Id. at 81-82. The court excused UPS, as did theN.H. Motor Transport III court, from "present[ing] 
empirical evidence" on the extent of this effect. Id. at 82 n.14. 
180. Id. at 70. 
181. Aside from the "constructive knowledge" component itself, the term "knowingly," as used in the 
Proscribed Delivery Provision, is undefined by the Tobacco Delivery Law. See generally ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1551-59 (West 2004). Research uncovered only a single definition of"knowingly" in title 
22: section 8705-A( I )(8), applicable to knowing violation of healthcare information reporting 
requirements, provides that "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of that person's conduct 
when the person is aware that it is practically certain that that person's conduct will cause such a result." 
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previously noted, the effect of the N.H. Motor Transport III court's holding was to 
prevent enforcement of the Proscribed Delivery Provision against motor carriers and 
air/ground carriers. It is thus something of an open question whether the N.H. Motor 
Transport IV court's preemption decision with respect to the Proscribed Delivery 
Provision exalts form over substance: N.H. Motor Transport ///barred all enforcement 
against carriers; N.H. Motor Transport IV allows enforcement against carriers, but 
without a provision for "constructive knowledge," the court candidly recognized that 
actual knowledge, "as a practical matter, may be difficult to prove." 182 
V. IS THERE A WAY FORWARD IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT? 
In one sense, Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law can be characterized as being too 
clever. No doubt cognizant of the threat posed by litigation under the FAAAA, the 
Maine Legislature chose an elaborate enforcement scheme in the form of the Age 
Verification Provision, which essentially was an attempt to mask police power 
regulation of carriers by exercising that power through the private proxy of retailers, 
licensed and unlicensed alike. Apparently optimistic that the First Circuit would not 
construe the Age Verification Provision as "relating to" carrier services under the 
F AAAA, but instead to tobacco retailers, the legislature opted for statutory complexity 
in an effort to disturb this flow of commerce. 
The constructive knowledge component of the Proscribed Delivery Provision was 
no less complex: it depended upon on a confluence-within carriers' parcel routing 
facilities and delivery trucks-of specific labels, presumably affixed by parties without 
concrete motivation to do so, and accurate lists of unlicensed retailers maintained by 
the Attorney General. That being said, there is little reason to think that either 
provision would have fared better in the First Circuit were it enacted without the other. 
Each provision operates independently and is grounded on a discrete, if not equally 
persuasive, rationale. That one overreached did not determine the fate of the other; 
that both over reached, however, is a sign that complexity and obfuscation is not a 
preferred strategy. 
At first glance, New York's law, which forbids all cigarette deliveries to individual 
New York consumers, 183 appears to be an attractive model because of its simple, 
categorical nature. However, New York's law shares the defects of Maine's statutory 
scheme to the extent that its effectiveness against carriers depends on presumptions 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8705-A(l)(B) (West Supp. 2006-2007). With only immaterial alteration, 
this definition is identical to that found in the Maine Criminal Code. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 35(2)(A) (West 2006). It is unclear how the district court would interpret "knowingly" in the context of 
an enforcement action brought against a carrier pursuant to alleged violation of the Tobacco Delivery Law. 
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1556-A(2) (West 2004) (vesting jurisdiction over civil enforcement 
action in the district court). 
182. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 82. It should be noted, however, that in the court's view, 
the Proscribed Delivery Provision can only have survived FAAAA challenge without its teeth: the easier 
carrier violations are to prove, the greater the effect on carrier services. 
183. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 1399-11(2) (McKinney 2001), supra note 132. 
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relating to labeling and addressee information. 184 Nevertheless, litigation over the 
validity of New York's law resulted in a settlement on terms favorable to the state. 
Whether the UPS Settlement was a result of either (1) the New York law's three-stage 
trial by fire, 185 or (2) a split between the district courts of the Second Circuit and the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit over permissible interpretation of the 
FAAAA-and the continuing vitality of the ERISA-based Morales standard 186-is 
difficult to determine. However, it is relatively clear from the N.H. Motor Transport 
IV court's opinion that were Maine to enact a statute similar to New York's it would 
not pass muster if challenged under the F AAAA in the First Circuit. 
A possible way forward for the Maine law is that it could, for the sake of 
simplicity, focus on cigarettes alone, and include language similar to the following: 
The cigarette retailer, in addition to complying with the "Requirements for accepting 
order for delivery sale," provided in section 1555-C(2), 187 shall: 
(1) Use best efforts to ensure that the sole addressee of the package containing 
cigarettes is in fact the purchaser, whose legal age the retailer has previously verified; 
and 
(2) Use best efforts to ensure that only the individual addressee will ultimately 
receive the package containing cigarettes. For purposes of this section, proof of best 
efforts includes evidence that a retailer ships all cigarette packages to individual 
consumers via Restricted Delivery, a contractual service provided by the United 
States Post Office;188 and 
(3) Include with each monthly delivery sales report filed with the Department of 
Administrative and Financial Services, Bureau of Revenue Services proof that best 
efforts, as described in subsections (1) and (2) above, were used in every transaction 
executed during the period covered by the corresponding delivery sales report. 
In conjunction with age verification by the retailer at the time of purchase-a 
requirement that is currently in force and enjoying some measure of compliance 189 -
184. See id. at§ 1399-11(3) (requiring packages of cigarettes to be labeled as such, and presuming that 
a carrier knows the addressee of such a package is an individual consumer, to whom it is unlawful to deliver 
the package, if the delivery address is a home or residence). 
185. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
plaintiffs' dormant commerce clause challenge to New York's law); N.Y. State Motor Truck Ass'n v. 
Pataki, No. 03-CV-2386, 2004 WL2937803, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2004) (holding New York's law not 
facially preempted by the FAAAA and denying summary judgment on "as applied" claim under the 
F AAAA because genuine issue of fact remains regarding the extent of the New York law's effect on carrier 
services); Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying preliminary injunction 
because plaintiffs were found to be unlikely to prevail on merits ofF AAAA challenge to New York's law). 
186. See supra notes 155, 173 & 174. 
187. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(2) (West2004). This section of the Tobacco Delivery Law, 
which requires that the retailer confirm the purchaser is of legal age to purchase tobacco products, was 
undisturbed by the N.H. Motor Transport litigation. 
188. See U.S. POSTAL SERV., RATE INFORMATION AND EXTRA SERVICES (2007) (for a fee of$3.70 in 
excess of postage, Restricted Delivery "[p ]ermits a mailer to direct delivery only to the addressee ... [who] 
must be an individual specified by name."), available at http://www.usps.com/rates/extra-services-rates. 
htm#HIO. 
189. See, e.g., http://www.bigchiefcigarettes.com (advertising use of "Age Alert/Equifax Age 
Verification Service"); https://www.blackpawtobacco.com/intro.html (requiring that purchaser provide a 
copy of photographic identification prior to processing tobacco sale). 
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Restricted Delivery would ensure that the individual purchaser, whose age the retailer 
has already confirmed, is the only addressee and thus the only person who can accept 
delivery of the package. 
The new Cigarette Delivery Law, drafted along these lines, would presumably cut 
a very different profile in litigation under the F AAAA in the First Circuit for two 
reasons. First, instead of mandating the terms a retailer must demand of a delivery 
service, as did the preempted provisions of the Tobacco Delivery Law, the new 
provisions merely suggest that by choosing an option readily available in the 
marketplace, retailers will be in full compliance. The new law would have the virtue 
of facially allowing a retailer to adduce alternative proof that best efforts were made, 
even if the Postal Service's Restricted Delivery were not utilized. However, as is clear 
from the terms of Restricted Delivery, it is in fact the "best" option: it is currently 
available, and because it appears in the language of the statute, it is one of which 
retailers cannot claim to be unaware. Second, by lowering the bar for carriers from age 
verification on delivery to mere confirmation that the individual recipient is in fact the 
addressee, 190 it would be difficult for a private carrier like UPS--one that does not 
offer a service equivalent to the Postal Service's Restricted Delivery-to argue that the 
law has a "forbidden significant effect" on its service. The mere existence of a 
Restricted Delivery service option is prima facie evidence of its viability as part of an 
integrated parcel delivery business model. Indeed, if the Postal Service were unable 
to effectively pass on to its customers the additional costs associated with Restricted 
Delivery, it would no longer offer Restricted Delivery as a service option. Although 
UPS may well argue that the Postal Service's competitive services are cross-subsidized 
by its monopoly services, the issue would thus appear to be joined, in which case UPS 
would have to prove that fact to prevail on its F AAAA claim. 
Furthermore, when viewed objectively, Restricted Delivery is an eminently 
reasonable service option. That UPS may feel pressure to adopt and offer it in order 
to compete with the Postal Service for this business would perhaps not inexorably lead 
to a finding of "significant forbidden effect" in the same way the Age Verification 
Provision of the Tobacco Delivery Law did. To the extent research has failed to 
uncover any indication that any major carrier offered the terms required by the 
preempted Age Verification Provision at the time of its adoption, that provision 
appears to qualify as artificial regulation rather than the F AAAA-preferred marketplace 
dictation. In contrast, Restricted Delivery is currently available in the marketplace and, 
if exclusively utilized by Internet retailers, would accomplish Maine's legitimate goal 
of restricting minors' access to cigarettes. In answer to a claim by UPS, or a similarly 
situated carrier, that the new law exerts a "forbidden significant effect" on its services, 
Maine could persuasively argue that not only does a competitor in the industry already 
offer the suggested service at a premium, but also that the complaining carrier's 
F AAAA challenge is in effect a plea for the protection of the court from a competitive 
marketplace-a plea no carrier should be heard to make under the pro-competitive 
F AAAA. 191 Finally, given that free shipping often serves as an added incentive to 
190. Contra ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(J)(C)(I) (West 2004) ("The tobacco retailer shall 
utilize a delivery service that imposes the ... requirement [that] the purchaser ... be the addressee."). 
191. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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purchase cigarettes over the Internet, retailers would have to raise their prices in order 
to remain profitable and comply with the revised statute at the same time, which would 
in turn gradually depress future demand for tax-free cigarettes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As this Note has attempted to show, the difficulty with which the district court and 
the First Circuit-operating under the ERISA-based Morales standard for F AAAA 
preemption-wrestled with the presumption against preemption, "facial" versus "as-
applied" challenges to the Tobacco Delivery Law, and important jurisdictional issues, 
illustrates the towering aspect of federalism and the balance it forever demands. 
In part, the NH. Motor Transport IV court's holding was based on the unavoid-
able acknowledgement that "Congress often acts to address a specific problem but 
ultimately settles on a broader remedy." 192 Here, that broader remedy, the FAAAA, 
as it is being interpreted and applied by the First Circuit, is clearly having an adverse 
effect on Maine's ability to address yet another specific problem through legitimate, 
if perhaps too aggressive, police power enactments. Congress should recognize that 
in the present era of diffused commerce fostered by burgeoning Internet retail, 
interstate motor carriers of property should perhaps not, in all circumstances, be held 
harmless under our law. Once Congress determines which circumstances warrant 
conscription ofinterstate carriers to assist in furthering federal and state health policies, 
the reach of F AAAA preemption can be clarified and circumscribed, and the states 
thereby can be empowered to enact and enforce laws similar to Maine's Tobacco 
Delivery Law, in either its original or a revised form. 
192. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Penn. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 
524 U.S. 206,213 (1998)). 
